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Prologue 
This thesis is the culmination of my undergraduate academic journey and professional 
opportunities over the past four years. As an International Studies major intrigued by sustainable 
development, I have repeatedly been drawn to trends in global development and power 
imbalances between the Global North and Global South. This thesis is informed by my 
experience working for Amigos de las Americas in 2015 and 2017 and for the Inter-American 
Foundation in 2019. I would like to acknowledge that my experiences often influence my 
sympathetic critique of the Inter-American Foundation and grassroots development generally. 
This thesis is also informed by my positionality as a white, US-raised, college-educated woman. 
Despite the limitations my sympathies, positions, and experiences embody, it remains my belief 
that supporting grassroots development evaluation as an alternative approach to traditional 
methods can help improve the development industry. This thesis serves as an important capstone 
of my bachelors-level study and a catalyst into my career as a development professional.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
International development evaluation is crucial. Carefully monitored results, clearly 
identified impacts, and meticulously evaluated learning outcomes matter. Why? Because billions 
of taxpayer dollars fund these projects. Because politically motivated development programs are 
a product of government policy, both in donor and recipient countries. Because without 
international development evaluation, there is no clear way to gauge the extent to which 
programs succeed. Because all 193 member countries of the United Nations (UN) have adopted 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, committing to achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in 10 years time. Evaluation matters because it is being done 
inadequately.  
Tension within international development evaluation over modernity, expertise, progress, 
and technology begs the question of whether quantitative data are necessary to achieve and 
measure sustainable development. Some practitioners argue that quantitative data should be 
treated with skepticism because it perpetuates a computational way of thinking about 
development progress. Whether quantitative data perpetuates the comparative, hierarchical, and 
colonial legacy of development or if it promotes grassroots development is a key debate among 
post-development thinkers. These questions must be answered before creating an inclusive 
development evaluation paradigm that empowers grassroots organizations and works to achieve 
the SDGs. 
This thesis explores the challenges faced by the global community to create such a 
development evaluation paradigm. This introduction discusses how the development paradigm 
has shifted over the past 70 years due to pressure from post-development thinkers and promoters 
of grassroots development. Chapter two explores the use of data by development professionals in 
 Sterling 6 
 
evaluation procedures, dives into the complexities of measuring program impact, and explains 
how development organizations use data evaluation as a source of internal organizational 
learning. Chapter three focuses on the evaluation of the SDGs, the frameworks used to measure 
their implementation, and the limitations within this process. This chapter advocates for a 
method of data gathering and evaluation that affirms grassroots development efforts. Chapter 
four explores the role of national and local governments in evaluation; the chapter concludes by 
reaffirming the challenges and recommendations made in chapter three. Chapter five serves as a 
case study of the grassroots development efforts of the Inter-American Foundation (IAF). 
Finally, the conclusion weaves together the best practices presented throughout this thesis and 
calls for an improved industry-wide effort to evaluate progress towards the SDGs.  
Section One: A Framework for Discussing Development 
International development, as understood today, began 70 years ago. During President 
Harry Truman’s First Inaugural Address in 1949, he laid out a vision of the United States acting 
to “solve the problems of the ‘underdeveloped areas’ of the globe” (Escobar 1995, 3). In the 70 
years since that declaration, theorists have coined terms such as the “Global North” and the 
“Global South” to distinguish between countries with power, influence, and expert knowledge.1  
The traditional development paradigm is characterized by “structural shifts in national 
economies from the predominantly rural-agricultural to the urban-industrial” and movement 
away “from self-employment to wage-earning employment” and from “local markets to national 
markets” (Santos 1997, 12-13). Previously, leaders from the Global North implemented 
                                                
1 There are many divisive terms. “First World” and “Third World.” The West and the rest. Developed, developing, 
or underdeveloped. Colonizers and colonized. High-income and low-income. The terms “Global North” and “Global 
South” are currently used in the literature to distinguish wealthier, more “modern,” and more internationally 
influential countries (Global North) from the historically “undeveloped” countries, within which international 
development efforts are focused (Global South). References to “top-down” approaches refer to the expert knowledge 
and policy direction recommended and implemented by experts in the Global North. 
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development initiatives within the Global South and dictated how development occurred in these 
countries. While there is some recognition that this system is problematic, there has been no 
widespread reorganization of development initiatives to focus on grassroots organizations.  
During the 20th century, development professionals relied on their preconceived notions 
of Eurocentrism to categorize countries into “developed” and “developing” based on the 
dependency theory. Dependency theory stated that “attempts by poor nations to be self-reliant 
and independent in their development efforts were rendered difficult, and almost impossible, 
given the coexistence of rich and poor nations in an international system dominated by unequal 
power relationships between the center (developed countries) and the periphery (developing 
countries)” (Santos 1997, 18). Development experts in the Global North implemented top-down 
development processes to combat this state of dependency. These top-down approaches relied on 
the assumption that benefits would trickle down to local areas. Angelo Santos states that this 
“development from above,” constituted the creation of an “administrative state” whose goal was 
ultimately to “modernize but not to uproot the existing structures and processes, thereby keeping 
the poor, monoproducer developing societies locked into a cycle of dependence” upon the 
knowledge and methods of the Global North (internal quotations removed) (Santos 1997, 20, 
23). This ideology cemented a power dynamic resembling colonialism that continued to 
negatively affect the Global South into the 21st century. Top-down development typically 
required large amounts of external capital and large technological inputs, defining success 
through a Western idea of modernity. Lending requirements by global financial institutions and 
multilateral donors forced Global South countries to comply to receive funding.   
Although this ideology increased living conditions for millions around the world, 
programs and policies have often “left local people displaced, disempowered and destitute” 
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(Oliver-Smith 2010, 2). Development efforts failed to reach the “last mile,” meaning the poorest, 
least accessible, and most in-need population; “most programs simply do not see them” (Ajmera 
2016, 80).2 Studying the SDGs is just one way to explore the complexities of development 
evaluation. 
Section Two: The MDGs to the SDGs 
In September 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted the precursor to the SDGs, the 
Millenium Development Goals (MDGs). The creation of these seven goals was climactic 
because it marked the first instance of global partnership focused on global development. The 
UN mandated specific development objectives which controlled development efforts in the 
Global South over the next 15 years. The MDGs included aspirations such as eradicating 
extreme poverty, achieving universal primary education, improving maternal and child health, 
and ensuring environmental sustainability. A systematic flaw of the MDGs was that they 
functioned as mandates for the Global South, rather than objectives for all countries. Some 
scholars from the Global South compare the imposition of the MDGs to the colonialism of the 
19th and 20th century. These critics condemn the MDGs’ furtherance of the paternalistic 
historical practices of the Global North towards countries in the Global South. Before the 15-
year mandate of the MDGs was complete, the UN began to prepare for the development of a 
second, better iteration of these global objectives.  
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, used a three-pronged 
holistic approach to improving lives through “economic development, environmental 
sustainability, and social inclusion” (Sachs 2012, 2206). These 17 goals function as “an urgent 
call for action by all countries - developed and developing - in a global partnership” to achieve 
                                                
2 Debates about development theory and practice are numerous; not all of these debates could be included here. 
Please refer to the Appendix for a select list of recommended resources. 
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goals such as ending poverty, achieving gender equality, and combating climate change (United 
Nations 2020a). The SDGs represent a high level of global partnership that did not exist in the 
development industry until their adoption.  
One such area in which partnership emerged was in “data, monitoring, and 
accountability” (United Nations 2020b). The methodology promoted by the United Nations for 
tracking the progress towards these goals recommends “scientific methods” and “support for data 
and statistics” for “developing countries” (United Nations 2020b). This UN recommendation 
prioritises data collected by national governments and supranational organizations like the World 
Bank and OECD. These entities operate at a large scale, often failing to take grassroots 
development efforts into account. The resulting evaluation of progress towards sustainable 
development inevitably prioritizes quantitative data and analysis by supranational organizations 
while ignoring grassroots evaluation, despite grassroots development having existed for 50 years. 
Section three introduces grassroots development.  
Section Three: A Call for Grassroots Development 
Grassroots development has emerged as an alternative to traditional development. 
Sheldon Annis and Peter Hakim define grassroots development as an “approach to economic and 
social development in which the best way to help those in need is to finance the organizations 
that they themselves create and control” (Annis and Hakim 1988). Santos notes that grassroots 
organizations allow “participants to empower themselves and better their condition” and carry on 
autonomous efforts even when imported programs have ended (Santos 1997, 42). Rather than 
being designed in distant boardrooms of multinational institutions, grassroots development relies 
on local leaders to design and implement programs. Local organizations are empowered to grow, 
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evolve, and deepen their work, even after external funding expires. Their autonomy is central to 
their financial, ethical, and political appeal.  
One organization that highlights the success of grassroots development is Capiibary. The 
Paraguayan cooperative combats outmigration fueled by agro-industrial soy projects that destroy 
forests and water resources. Researchers found that Capiibary was able to be a “learning 
organization with the capacity to generate and share knowledge in the pursuit of long-term 
sustainability” (León et al 2017, 70). Capiibary’s work developing and managing a sustainable 
small-scale farming strategy “challenges practitioners and academics to question their own often 
romanticized notions of sustainable development among smallholders” by proving that 
grassroots organizations can be successful (León et al 2017, 72). Evidence from cooperatives 
like Capiibary help challenge traditional development thinking.  
Many grassroots development efforts stem from communities where citizens are 
mobilized to collective action. According to Albert O. Hirschman, “collective action is provoked 
by some common, usually adverse, experience to which a group of people is subjected” 
(Hirschman 1984, 27). This communal struggle motivates individuals to take action they feel is 
best suited to solve the problem. It is important to study the capacity of organizations not only to 
enact their program, but also to measure their program’s impact, in whatever way they define it. 
The learning conducted at the grassroots level is typically reserved for organizations and funders. 
Limited learning prevents grassroots organizations from sharing their evaluation with the larger 
development industry. By more widely sharing knowledge, grassroots organizations can inspire 
supranational organizations and governments to support more grassroots development programs.   
Section Four: Underlying Theory — A Post-Development Framework 
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Grassroots development stems from the post-development understanding of social change 
that is “rooted in the agency of local communities who identify their own problems and … move 
away from development as a Western-dominated ideology and a form of cultural imperialism” 
(Escobar and Harcourt 2018, 6). Post-development pushes back against the many practices of 
traditional development. Aram Ziai summarizes post-development criticisms of traditional 
development: (1) it is a western ideology that attempts to prevent the expansion of communism, 
(2) it wrongly universalizes a “developed” way of life on a global scale, (3) it is Eurocentric and 
assumes non-Western, non-modern, and non-industrial ways of life are inferior, (4) it focuses on 
wealth accumulation and perpetuates capitalist logic, (5) and finally, it legitimizes external 
interventions into the lives of the “less developed” people for the sake of the common good as 
defined by “experts” (Ziai 2017, 2547-2548). Ziai reflects that the post-development movement 
is about reclaiming the commons and seeking autonomy. Ziai further argues that one of post-
development’s most important contributions is breaking “the consensus about ‘development’ 
being necessary, self-evident, positive and unquestionable, and thus pave the way for more 
nuanced analyses” (Ziai 2017, 2550).  
Gustavo Esteva, the father of post-development, has shifted his view on the role statistics 
can play to evaluate development. He posits, it is “right … [to] open a decent door” to the people 
who are genuinely “concerned with the real problems of the world [and] interested in making a 
difference” (Esteva and Escobar 2017, 2562). He argues that “people studying development can 
accompany and support … the many paths people are following around the world beyond 
development” (Esteva and Escobar 2017, 2562). This expanded role in the post-development 
framework for quantitative data, research, and statistics is an important shift. 
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Arturo Escobar joins Gustavo Esteva’s call for shifting the power dynamic between 
development providers and recipients. Escobar and Esteva propose rejecting cooperation as 
development aid. They feel “the standard form of cooperation, practiced by institutions such as 
USAID, the World Bank and mainstream NGOs” enforces colonialism and dispossession (Esteva 
and Escobar 2017, 2564). Escobar and Esteva first advocate for cooperation as, or for, social 
justice. Cooperation for social justice embraces human rights, environmental justice, and direct 
support for grassroots groups. However, Escobar primarily advocates for cooperation for 
autonomy. Escobar describes cooperation for autonomy as “embrac[ing] all sides in the same ... 
movement for civilizational transitions and inter-autonomy” by the meshing of communities in 
both the Global North and Global South (Esteva and Escobar 2017, 2564). Escobar 
acknowledges that there are “no ready-available models for this third kind of solidarity 
cooperation” (Esteva and Escobar 2017, 2564). One potential way to facilitate the creation of this 
kind of coalition-building is to bring more attention to grassroots evaluation. By learning from 
community successes at the local level, the development industry will be more capable of 
achieving the cooperation for autonomy proposed by the fathers of post-development.  
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Chapter Two: Using Data for Impact Evaluation and Learning 
 Two types of data, quantitative and qualitative, exist for the purposes of development. 
Qualitative data have been used as the main source of knowledge of development professionals 
for decades. However, development evaluation increasingly incorporates quantitative data. In 
2016, the UN Global Pulse Initiative, which focuses on using data and monitoring to improve 
development programs, commissioned an independent consultant, Michael Bamberger, to report 
on the role that big data3 might play in facilitating development evaluation in the future. While 
this report focuses on the impact of big data, it reveals some important insights about generating 
data and creating knowledge. The conclusion of the report finds that there is a “need for bridge 
building between data scientists and evaluators to allow for the development of a common 
language and to identify promising areas where big data analytics can be applied in development 
evaluation contexts” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 22). The report notes that before big 
data can be fully embraced, “many agencies are still in the early stages of understanding big data 
and its potential applications in development” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 38). While 
there are uncertainties about how big data will be used in the future, it is believed that it will 
support and enhance the work already done with data. Data in evaluation can be used for 
monitoring, evaluation and learning.  
 Monitoring is collecting data about what occurs in projects. How many beneficiaries 
attended the training? How much money was distributed as microloans to women entrepreneurs? 
What was the crop yield on the disease-resistant coffee trees? Answers to these questions 
constitute monitoring. Evaluation, however, takes the knowledge from data to another level. 
                                                
3 Big data is understood as part of the “digital revolution,” a term coined in 2013. This revolution consists of “an 
explosion in the volume of data, the speed with which data are produced, the number of producers of data, the 
dissemination of data, and the range of things on which there is data, coming from new technologies such as mobile 
phones” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 30). 
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According to a report by USAID, evaluation goes a step beyond monitoring to ask questions 
such as “why and how a project or activity is achieving, or not achieving, its objectives” (U.S. 
Agency for International Development 2016, 8). Ultimately, evaluations are different from 
monitoring because they make a “judgment about project performance” (U.S. Agency for 
International Development 2016, 8). Furthermore, there are two primary types of evaluations: 
impact evaluations and performance evaluations. Performance evaluations measure “how” a 
program is being implemented, perceived, and valued. However, evaluation in the context of this 
thesis refers to impact evaluations. Impact evaluations “measure the change in a development 
outcome that is attributable to a defined intervention” (U.S. Agency for International 
Development 2016, 9). An intervention only has an impact when it can be proven “how a 
program or organization has changed the world around it” (Gugerty and Karlan 2018b, 42). In 
the last 30 years, the industry gold standard has shifted to conducting impact evaluations with 
rigorous counterfactuals through a process called randomized control trials (RCTs). 
RCTs originated in the medical field, but in the 1980s were incorporated into 
development evaluation. A RCT is successfully completed when there are both an intervention 
group and a control group. Control groups are needed to determine if something changed as a 
result of an intervention or as a result of an external factor. In development, proponents of RCTs 
argue that this is needed for rigorous evaluation because in complex environments, many 
potential variables could be causing changes. After observing an outcome without a RCT, 
organizations might jump to the conclusion that their intervention has caused the observed 
change. However, if there is no control group, it may not be clear what factor caused the shift in 
the experimental group. Potentially, the result is due to better weather or an improved 
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macroeconomic landscape and not the development intervention at all. Proponents of RCTs 
argue that without the counterfactual, it is impossible to “prove” if a program has created impact.   
RCTs also have their critics. Evaluators who center rights-based approaches argue that 
there is a “need to listen to multiple voices” in evaluation. They assert, “that there is no one way 
to identify or assess programme outcomes” and worry that RCTs impose a one-size fits all 
method (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 54). These critics point out that in many instances, 
capturing quantitative data are impossible or inefficient to understand a development 
intervention. RCTs come from evaluating medical interventions where it is easier, compared to 
poverty interventions, to determine the results of a program. An example of a medical 
intervention would be an HIV vaccine or distributing bed nets to families. Here, it is easy to 
track who received the intervention and who did not. But poverty alleviation interventions are 
not as tangible. It is much harder to determine the extent to which farmers have adopted the 
lessons from a workshop focused on planting and harvesting drought-resistant crops. A bed net 
program seeks one outcome, less mosquito-borne illness. However, an economic empowerment 
and sustainable agriculture intervention could be striving to achieve 20 different economic, 
social, and political outcomes. Designing counterfactual scenarios for development interventions 
takes many financial and human resources. This is where RCTs fall short.  
Some development professionals criticize impact evaluations citing that the efforts are 
unsuccessful and meaningless. According to Mary Kay Gugerty and Dean Karlan, measuring 
impact is an “out of balance trend” that has led to a “proliferation of poor methods … resulting in 
organizations wasting huge amounts of money on bad ‘impact evaluations’” (Gugerty and Karlan 
2018a, viii). Gugerty and Karlan question why conduct impact evaluations at all if they are 
extremely expensive and turn out badly. Gugerty and Karlan may criticize the current methods 
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for evaluation, but they support why organizations evaluate: organizational learning and 
improvement.  
 Organizations engage in evaluation for two reasons: accountability and learning. 
Accountability is “transparently disclosing findings to all stakeholders” about the progress an 
organization has promised (U.S. Agency for International Development 2016, 8). Learning is 
“systematically generating and sharing knowledge about how best to achieve development 
outcomes” and “using that knowledge to inform decisions, adapt ongoing projects and improve 
the design of future projects” (U.S. Agency for International Development 2016, 8). This 
distinction in audience between accountability and learning is important. The audience for 
accountability is an organization’s funders, board of directors, and individuals who download an 
organization's annual review off of their website. For learning, the audience tends to be the 
internal employees of the organization. Unfortunately, many audiences are grossly excluded 
from receiving evaluation information. This includes the people who are being monitored (the 
beneficiaries of programs) and the larger overall development industry (the UN, supranational 
organizations, and national governments). In most impact evaluation, the learning gained from 
evaluation remains confined to a limited group of people. 
How organizations learn is an important component of evaluations. On the base level of 
an organization’s work are the target beneficiaries. Typically, a funding organization will 
mandate the use of a framework of indicators to track the results of a project. After the 
organization has decided on a set of indicators, measured results are gathered from the project 
location. This information is passed up to the professionals employed by the funder. 
Organizations then proceed with the evaluation based on the data they have collected. 
Traditionally, the knowledge from the evaluation is reserved for those internal to the funder 
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organization. If beneficiaries are not given access to the evaluation or the tools to understand it, 
they are unable to learn for themselves. This further inhibits learning for grassroots leaders.  
Grassroots organizations are additionally disadvantaged by the delayed evaluation and 
learning timeline of development. When organizations do evaluations, they draw conclusions 
across their portfolio of projects. This allows an organization to observe trends with the hope of 
improving their programs in a future portfolio, not the current one. This after-the-fact learning is 
mainly due to the limitations of funding cycles. Funding cycles are very short in development, 
typically financing one- or two-year projects. The results of short projects might not be evident 
until many years after the official expiration. Therefore, evaluation and learning is completed 
after the opportunity to make changes to current projects has passed. Development impacts are 
felt by those at the grassroots level before the organizations that manage the programs. This 
leaves beneficiaries caught in a potentially adverse program with no opportunity to change the 
funder’s behavior. 
Data clearly contributes to overall development evaluation and learning. Conducting 
impact evaluation for learning is a vital part of the development process, but one that falls short 
for grassroots organizations. Even when organizations continue efforts to evaluate, learn, and 
improve their programs, the promise of achieving the SDGs remains elusive. The following 
chapter will explore how evaluation and learning efforts relate to the SDGs.   
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Chapter Three: How To Measure Progress Towards The SDGs 
Section One: The Foundation of the SDGs 
On January 1, 2016, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) came into effect. 
These goals established the development objectives that all countries would work to achieve in 
15 years time. The update to the SDGs ushered in a new focus of using quantitative data, 
statistics, technology, and evaluation to track global development. 
Some authors, such as Wolfgang Sachs, hoped that the SDGs would correct the errors of 
the preceding MDGs. Sachs calls the MDGs “visionary” but “non-binding” and lacking a 
“sanction mechanism” (Sachs 2017, 2574). Sachs worried that the SDGs could solidify the old 
practice of foraging a “disconnect between international rhetoric,” which continued to support 
land grabbing, coal mining and foreign financing, and “national measures” (Sachs 2017, 2574). 
Sachs praised the SDGs for ending the aspiration of sky-high growth that was traditionally 
promised by development. The SDGs are “more or less narrowed down to requirements for 
survival” instead of seeing development as a linear path that Global South countries follow to 
achieve the modernity of the Global North (Sachs 2017, 2575). The SDGs’ focus is improving 
livelihoods in non-prescriptive ways by giving all countries the freedom to decide what their own 
development might look like while still striving towards shared goals. Fundamentally, the SDGs 
allow the industry to engage more fully in grassroots development. 
Using the SDGs’ social indicators to measure development progress “replaced GDP in 
determining the performance of a country” (Sachs 2017, 2578). Supporters of using data to 
measure social indicators believe that “one can only improve what one has previously measured” 
(Sachs 2017, 2578). Sachs is not an advocate for using data to measure progress. He fears that 
“the simplification and complex reduction that numbers and quantification offer” leads to a 
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“homogenizing” effect (Sachs 2017, 2578). Sachs sees this as boiling down global diversity into 
a scale of numbers. Sachs argues that relying on “quantitative data” furthers a “dictatorship of 
comparison … that constructs deficits along the time axis between … nations” (Sachs 2017, 
2578). Sachs’ concern is echoed by Thomas Carroll. Carroll writes that Latin American 
development practitioners and academics “mistrust” quantitative methods “partly because of the 
feeling that they fail to take into account unique aspects of individual cases” (Waters 2004, 57).  
Some authors embrace quantitative data. Jeffery Sachs asserts that technology will be 
able to collect data more quickly from rural areas enabling Global South governments to enact 
data-informed policy. Sachs specifically notes that “mobile phone, wireless broadband, and 
remote sensing” have an important future role to play in quantitative data collection (Sachs 2012, 
2210). Jeffery Sachs, unlike Wolfgang Sachs, advocates for quantitative data as a global priority 
to achieve sustainable development (Sachs 2012, 2206).  
Post-development thinkers take the side of Wolfgang Sachs and Thomas Carroll over 
Jeffery Sachs on the debate of technology and quantitative data. According to Esteva and 
Escobar, improved development is not achieved through quantitative data collection, but by 
completely rejecting the ideology underlying development. Unfortunately, for post-development 
theorists, quantitative data have taken center stage in evaluating the SDGs. 
Section Two: Using Data to Evaluate the SDGs 
 Many organizations evaluate progress towards the SDGs using quantitative methods. J-
PAL, an evaluation research organization founded at MIT in 2003, argues that data should be at 
the center of development evaluation. J-PAL researches the benefits of “survey instruments, data 
collection, statistical analysis, and data publishing” (“J-PAL,” n.d.). They conclude that 
quantitative methods like these help to translate “research into action” and promote “a culture of 
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evidence-informed policymaking around the world” (“J-PAL,” n.d.). J-PAL’s hope is to increase 
the global standard of government policy informed by evidence and data. J-PAL’s advocacy for 
quantitative data reflects Jeffery Sachs’ belief that it produces improved development evaluation. 
The SDGs and supranational organizations embrace J-PAL and Sachs’ method. The embrace of 
quantitative data has established an industry practice of top-down data collection and learning. 
Evidence of this effect is seen in data projects like SDG-Tracker.org.  
SDG-Tracker.org is a data visualization tool focused on the SDGs run by researchers at 
the University of Oxford and the Global Change Data Lab. The Global Change Data Lab is home 
to Our World in Data, a resource that compiles data from a variety of “official, high-quality 
sources” including the World Bank, World Health Organization, and various UN branches 
(Ritchie et al 2018). The creators describe the website as “an interactive hub where users can 
explore and track progress … in such a way that everyone can engage” (Ritchie et al 2018). 
SDG-Tracker.org presents data within the framework of the SDGs’ targets and indicators. As an 
example, SDG 1, to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere,” is broken into 7 targets and 14 
indicators by the UN. To evaluate progress towards an indicator, researchers at SDG-Tracker.org 
identify data that can be used to measure it. Following the example of SDG 1, the first target 
(abbreviated 1.1) is to “eradicate extreme poverty.” This target includes one indicator of the 
same name, “eradicate extreme poverty” (abbreviated 1.1.1) (Ritchie et al 2018). To evaluate 
indicator 1.1.1, those living in extreme poverty, on less than the international poverty line of 
$1.90 international dollars a day, are counted (Ritchie et al 2018). To track this indicator, the 
researchers at SDG-Tracker.org pull data from the World Bank Development Research Group. 
These data come from household surveys “obtained from government statistical agencies and 
World Bank country departments” (Ritchie et al 2018). Researchers turn to the World Bank 
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because it, along with other supranational organizations, hold a monopoly on available data. This 
limits what information is available to conduct evalutions of SDGs progress. 
The researchers at SDG-Tracker.org are aware of the data inadequacy. They note that 
“timeliness, frequency, quality, and comparability of household surveys need to increase 
substantially” for a complete evaluation of indicator 1.1.1 (Ritchie et al 2018). While they use 
World Bank and national government data, they know it is insufficient. An additional 
impediment to tracking poverty reduction is disagreement on which data best measure SDG 1. 
Household income is currently used, yet, some researchers believe that measuring household 
living standards better predicts poverty because “income can vary over time even if living 
standards do not” (Ritchie et al 2018). The researchers worry that the World Bank and national 
government data they use fails to account for countries' “different definitions of poverty” 
(Ritchie et al 2018). Data collection is further complicated by the fact that: 
“Most low-income countries do not have systematic data collection processes, and 
especially in marginalized communities populations are fluid … Accordingly, it is 
exceedingly difficult … to establish baselines, identify trends, and quantify impact with 
complete surety … The most marginalized often remain outside the reach of systemic 
interventions and the data that tracks their impact” (Ajmera 2016, 80).  
 
The inability of top-down evaluation and data collection methods to access information 
from the most marginalized populations is further evidence that data procedures need to improve. 
The monopoly of available data and the unresolved question about data sources 
illuminates concerns regarding who controls data. SDG-Tracker.org exposes supranational 
organizations like the World Bank as development knowledge tyrants. These organizations 
centralize the production of knowledge. This would not be as problematic if their data did not 
originate from their own sources and methods or if they duly accounted for poverty in the hardest 
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to reach places. SDG evaluators should be concerned that global knowledge about development 
progress omits local realities.  
Additional concerns arise regarding the evaluation for SDG 1. According to SDG-
Tracker.org, many of the 14 indicators that make up SDG 1 lack target reduction guidelines 
which are needed to inform development policy. As an example, take indicator 1.A.3, “Inflows 
directly allocated to poverty reduction programmes” (Ritchie et al 2018). This indicator advises 
practitioners how to direct financing more effectively to target poverty reduction. The indicator 
reads: 
Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through 
enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means 
for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement 
programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions (Ritchie et al 2018). 
 
 The indicator provides no definition of what constitutes a “significant” mobilization. Nor 
does it indicate which funding sources should be included in a “variety.” No benchmark for 
enhanced development cooperation is established. There is no definition for what comprises an 
“adequate” or “predictable” means to implement programs. This indicator leaves countless 
unanswered questions. The SDGs are intended to offer a clear roadmap to development actors 
about how they should design their programs to achieve sustainable development. The UN is 
right to not mandate a specific policy direction that threatens to infringe on state autonomy, but 
undermining the clarity of the SDG indicators with vague language is a failure of the UN’s 
intention to provide global leadership. 
One would hope that in the five years since this indicator was adopted, some organization 
or government would have decoding this language and improved their allocation of inflows. One 
would also hope that data to evaluate this indicator would exist. Unfortunately, the researchers at 
SDG-Tracker.org, using the highest quality sources, “are currently not aware of data for this 
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indicator” (Ritchie et al 2018). This is astounding given that thousands of organizations work 
every day to allocate more than “significant” amounts of funding towards poverty reduction. 
Small government agencies, international NGOs, grassroots groups, and agricultural 
cooperatives learn more every day about the success and failure of their poverty reduction 
programs. Yet, their data is not displayed on the SDG-Tracker.org website. One significant 
barrier to changing that reality is overcoming the supremacy afforded to data gathered and 
published by the World Bank and national governments. 
SDG-Tracker.org reveals that traditional evaluation methods have fallen short. First, 
development knowledge production and official data collection is controlled by supranational 
organizations. This generates a disconnect between the information that is widely acknowledged 
as SDG progress and the nuanced contexts of poverty reduction programs in local communities. 
Second, the language of indicators meant to clarify how to engage funding for sustainable 
development is cryptic. Therefore, the development evaluation industry needs to adopt 
previously unacknowledged data sources and improve how SDG progress is conveyed. If the 
purpose of development evaluation is learning, SDG-Tracker.org clearly is insufficient. The next 
section examines whether evaluative frameworks are better for tracking progress towards the 
SDGs.  
Section Three: Using Frameworks to Evaluate the SDGs 
 Researchers at the Swiss Sustainability Hub (SSH) have developed the GAPFRAME (GF) 
to evaluate SDG progress. The GF is a “normative framework” that serves the purpose of 
“translating” the SDGs “into nationally relevant issues and indicators” (GAPFRAME 2017b). 
Instead of comparing countries’ progress to one another like SDG-Tracker.org, this method 
compares countries to themselves to analyze “where a country is today as compared to where it 
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should be in the future” (GAPFRAME 2017b). The GF recommends concrete, practical actions 
that each country should be able to understand and adopt into their national policy. 
 The GF research team brings together academics, non-profit organizations, government 
leaders, and company executives, dubbed “sustainability thought leaders,” to devise a “pragmatic 
answer to the question of how we all can make a difference to the problems in this world” 
(GAPFRAME 2017c). The central component of the GF is the “target Safe Space,” a 
development sweet spot that corresponds to the framework’s 68-indicator design (GAPFRAME 
2017a). The Safe Space is not directly related to the 17 goals, 169 targets, or 232 indicators 
established under the SDGs. Instead, the Safe Space exists within the GF’s four sustainability 
dimensions — planet, society, economy, and governance — which incorporates 24 underlying 
issues, and is tracked by 68 indicators. In the GF, the 232 SDG indicators becomes a more 
manageable 68. The GF pitches its 24 issue areas as “relevant to all nations” (GAPFRAME 
2017b). On each of the 24 issues, a country receives a score out of 10. A score of 10 represents 
the “ideal value,” meaning a country is performing perfectly regarding this issue. This is 
practically impossible to achieve. Therefore, the GF creators design the Safe Space range of 
values from 7.5 to 8.8 on any issue as the target. A country is performing “‘good enough’” on an 
issue if their score falls within the Safe Space range of values (GAPFRAME 2017b). If they 
score below 7.5, they need to improve their policy in that area.  
The “economy” dimension and the “society” dimension are used to evaluate poverty 
alleviation. In the economy dimension, the top four performers are Sweden, Switzerland, France, 
and Austria. Again, unsurprisingly, the top for countries ranked in the society dimension are 
Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland.  
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Figure 1 - The GAPFRAME 4 dimensions (planet, society, economy, and governance) 
and their 24 underlying issues 
  
The 17 SDGs are not explicitly included in the GF. To investigate the evaluation for a 
single SDG, one has to identify which of the 24 issues most represents it. For SDG 1 that is the 
“quality of life” issue in the society dimension (See Figure 1). The “quality of life” issue 
quantifies how “nations provide the basis for sustainable human and economic development, 
lowering poverty and helping people afford a better quality of life” (GAPFRAME 2017d). 
Similar to SDG-Tracker.org, limited data exists to evaluate quality of life. The GF is intended to 
provide data for each issue of each country, yet, only 36 out of 193 countries receive a Safe 
Space score for quality of life. An evaluation of quality of life does not exist for most countries 
because the underlying proxies, life satisfaction, quality of support network, work-life balance, 
and poverty among the population, all lack data. The data for the first three of these proxies 
comes from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the data 
for poverty among the population comes from the World Bank. 
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The OECD comprises 37 member countries and, along with “key partners,” represents 
80% of the world trade and investment (OECD 2019).4 There are only three Global South 
country members, Mexico, Chile, and Colombia. Countries are accepted as members if they 
adhere to the OECD “mission and values” and are ready to take on the “demanding task” and 
“responsibilities and requirements of active membership” (OECD 2019). This standard precludes 
all but 37 countries. While the OECD boasts that its members spread the globe from “North and 
South America to Europe and Asia-Pacific,” there is a jarring omission of countries from the 
Global South (OECD 2019). Slovenia gained membership in 2010, the same year as Chile. 
Slovenia’s GDP is just below $50 billion. Brazil, not even listed as a “candidate for accession,” 
has a GDP of $2 trillion, four times the size of Slovenia (OECD 2019). 
Brazil is, however, identified as an OECD “key partner.” Key partners “participate in the 
OECD’s daily work, bringing useful perspectives and increasing the relevance of policy debates” 
(OECD 2019). It is shocking that an organization whose mission is to use shared knowledge and 
global partnership to track global challenges relies on countries not suitable enough to be 
members to make their policy more relevant. These key partners who provide these “useful 
perspectives” and “increase the relevance” of policy are none other than five countries from the 
Global South: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa.  
It is concerning that this high ranking and well-regarded institution is predominantly 
insulated by European groupthink. The OECD and World Bank are not simply membership 
organizations that collect and publish unbiased data. They are key supranational organizations 
whose efforts focus on knowledge generation and policy proposals. It is wrong that the same 
organizations that influence millions of dollars of development funding also generate some of the 
only globally available development data. 
                                                
4 Colombia became the 37th member on April 28, 2020 
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The gaps in the World Bank and OECD data prevent the GF from being effective. For a 
GF dimension to receive a score, 60% of data must exist. For the society dimension, only 143 
countries reach the data threshold to receive a calculation. For an issue to be calculated, 50% of 
the data must exist. Only 36 countries receive a quality of life calculation because “some 
indicators have available data only for the OECD countries'' (GAPFRAME 2017b). Of the 36 
countries with a quality of life calculation, 35 are OECD countries. Vital development evaluation 
is conducted at times only from OECD data. This overwhelmingly prioritizes the successes of 
Global North countries while leaving out information about much of the Global South. 
To test the usefulness of the GF, take the example of a country like Bolivia and run 
through a hypothetical scenario. Bolivia is hoping to enact evidence-informed development 
policy. According to the GF, the largest priority area for Bolivia is society under which the 
quality of life issue falls. For the 24 issues, quality of life happens to be one of three without 
sufficient data. Of the four proxies that make up what would be Bolivia’s quality of life score, 
only poverty among the population has data (from the World Bank). The other “universal” 
proxies receive no score because the data comes from the OECD of which Bolivia is not a 
member. Therefore, the proxies life satisfaction, quality of support network, and work-life 
balance do not have data.  
According to the GF, Bolivia should improve its society dimension following the 
recommendation of the GF’s “nationally relevant issues and indicators.” By default, one of 
Bolivia’s top priorities should be achieving an improved work-life balance among its population. 
An educated guess would assume that grassroots organizations and the Bolivian government 
define a better quality of life using a different proxy that is not improving work-life balance. 
Ultimately, the GF is disappointing for Bolivia’s hopes to develop evidence-informed 
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development policy. This is because very little data exists to evaluate its performance and the 
nationally relevant benchmarks do not apply to its local context. 
The central barrier to achieving improved development evaluations is the lack of diverse 
data sources. SDG-Tracker.org and the GF reveal a glaring vacancy: data, monitoring, and 
evaluation done by organizations at the grassroots is absent from the global discussion of SDG 
progress. One proposal to improve SDG evaluation is to incorporate technological methods. The 
following section explores the complexities of incorporating technology into measuring SDG 
progress.  
Section Four: The Technological Challenge of Evaluating the SDGs 
 Emerging technologies are opening up new opportunities for using data to evaluate 
progress towards the SDGs. According to Michael Bamberger, the SDGs bring a unique 
complexity to evaluators already trying to measure and evaluate the impact of development 
interventions. The SDGs encompass “multiple interventions in multiple contexts and with 
multiple stakeholders involved in large and ambitious programmes” (United Nations Global 
Pulse 2016, 33). Bamberger writes that achieving the SDGs “requires the use of new, and still 
evolving complexity–responsive evaluation methods” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 33). In 
2015 when the goals were adopted, Bamberger reports that the evaluation techniques required to 
comprehend SDG progress did not fully exist. 
Technology for data collection evolves extremely fast. Bamberger writes, “the volume of 
information is beyond the computing capacity of conventional computers, and the complexities 
introduced by the need to assess interactions among many components also requires new forms 
of data analytics” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 33). Conventional monitoring and 
evaluation methods may not be capable of keeping up. Even before the adoption of the SDGs, 
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development professionals “recognized the limited ability of current evaluation methodologies to 
gauge complex development programmes” (United Nations Global Pulse 34, 2016). Since 
current evaluation methods fall short, exploring the potential benefits of evaluation aided by 
technology needs to be a top priority. 
The extent to which data collection and evaluation aided by technology will bring the 
needed improvement to SDG evaluation is up for debate. Some worry that the use of “new 
information technologies will be used extractively by governments, large development agencies 
and corporations” going forward (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 31). If measures to 
empower grassroots groups are not implemented, the result would be “poor and vulnerable 
groups having less, rather than more, information and control over decisions and policies 
affecting their lives” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 31). New technology that continues to 
ignore data from grassroots organizations furthers the Eurocentrism of traditional development. 
Bamberger’s report calls for incorporating non-tech-enabled data collected by grassroots 
organizations with the mass-collected quantitative data collected by supranational organizations. 
Both resources together paint a more complete picture of the realities in disadvantaged areas. 
Both data sets are necessary because in many instances, data cannot be collected without human 
interaction. The human dimension to conduct case studies, in-depth interviews, and focus groups 
requires visiting communities. Only after a level of trust is reached, especially with marginalized 
members of a community, will those members feel confident to engage in a technological data 
collection method that can be introduced later (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 49). A 
combination of analog surveying with tech-enabled tracking will ensure the best data can be 
collected and evaluated.  
 Sterling 30 
 
According to Bamberger, big data is not incompatible with development work. He is 
confident that big data can be combined with the information development agencies are already 
collecting through their conventional analysis (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 34). 
Bamberger hopes that development practitioners will come to more fully embrace big data and 
quantitative methods. He argues that “big data is often combined with, or validated through 
mixed method techniques and other qualitative approaches” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 
37). However, hiring the talent to carry out evaluations using big data is beyond the capacity of 
most grassroots organizations and funders. Big data analysis requires highly-specific expertise 
and expensive hardware and software. 
If and when big data analytics are incorporated into development evaluation, there are 
inevitably going to be growing pains. According to Bamberger, “most data scientists operate 
within a very different research and management paradigm than do most [development] 
evaluators” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 43). Professionals with different expertise and 
who come from different industries will struggle to adapt their work to goals as large as the 
SDGs. Overcoming this challenge will require “bridge–building to create a space for 
development of a common understanding” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 43).  
Another challenge of incorporating big data analytics into development is that most data 
analytics is currently carried out for business and commercial interests. If big data is used for 
development, data will be referring to vulnerable populations, not consumers. Conducting 
development research using big data will require “a broader focus and the need to dig deeper” 
than marketing and business evaluations call for (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 46). The 
development industry and data analytics industry will need to combine their theory of change. 
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Achieving improved evaluation aided by big data will require careful management to bridge 
these divides.  
A further step required to successfully shift evaluation practices includes finding better 
ways to publish evaluation results. Currently, high-level technical skills are needed to not only 
collect big data and complete the evaluation, but also to publish and interpret the results. This 
barrier of entry prevents beneficiaries, who tend to be education- and resource-poor, from 
accessing evaluative information. The educational and technical divide is most clear when 
evaluation findings are released and only certain stakeholders are prioritized (United Nations 
Global Pulse 2016, 56-57). Evaluators are not incentivised to produce reports for any additional 
stakeholders beyond donors and the organizations that conduct the study. According to 
Bamberger, “often many interested NGOs, civil society and community organizations never 
receive the findings” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 56-57). The difficult task of 
“translating” evaluation findings into a language that can be widely understood means that many 
beneficiaries never receive the reports or are not able to offer feedback. The unfortunate result is 
that “the views of large sectors of the population affected by different interventions are never 
received” (United Nations Global Pulse 2016, 57). If program beneficiaries and grantees cannot 
provide feedback, development programs and evaluations will remain flawed. To achieve 
comprehensive development evaluation with equitable global access, there needs to be improved 
efforts to make evaluation knowledge accessible to all.   
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Chapter Four: Shifting Views on Development Evaluation 
This chapter explores which organizations take the lead in both enacting development 
programs as well as conducting evaluations. Grassroots organizations are increasingly funded to 
carry out development programs but remain absent from evaluation procedures. Luckily, the 
industry is on the brink of a major shift. 
Section One: The Role of Governments in Development and Evaluation 
International development projects are carried out on behalf of the United States by 
USAID. Many writers have criticized the agency, including Lars Schoultz. He believes that US 
government efforts have always been about “uplifting” people through development. Schoultz 
describes how USAID turned development funding from something that was ad-hoc into an 
institutionalized bureaucracy. Many of the millions of dollars spent by USAID to implement 
their programs flow to US-based contractors instead of local organizations. 
Aid funding through governments and agencies like USAID is a common practice, and 
before the boom of NGOs in the 1990s, was the main mechanism to deliver development aid 
funding. Federal and local governments were previously thought of as ideal project implementers  
who ensured grants made their way to local actors.  
USAID has faced criticism and pressure from writers, academics, and researchers like 
Schoultz for their failure to spend money locally. In 2010, they instituted a procurement reform 
after making a shocking discovery: of the money they spent on development programs 
worldwide, only 10% of their “benefiting country partners” were listed “in a top-line 
implementing role” (Dunning 2013, 1). An internal assessment discovered that 65% of “grants 
and contracts flowed to U.S.-based organizations,” not partners abroad where one would expect 
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the money to go (Dunning 2013, 1). A reform was flagrantly needed; USAID was continuing to 
operate with an expired ideology.   
The role of governments in development extends to data collection and evaluation. While 
governments collect a significant amount of national statistics, including those on development 
indicators, much is left to be desired. The concern is that national data collection projects, similar 
to large-scale development projects, are incapable of reaching those at the last mile. According to 
Maya Ajmera, people at the last mile are only properly accounted for by community-based 
groups (Ajmera 2016, 118).  
Building an opposition to government involvement in data collection and monitoring is 
hard given the history of governments monopolizing the practice in the past. According to B.K. 
Pattanaik, “the level below the state neither have adequate technical manpower” to undertake the 
exhaustive exercise of data collection nor do they have the “necessary functions, functionaries 
and funds to carry out this work” (Pattanaik 2016, 77). Pattanaik’s pessimism about the lacking 
capacity of organizations that exist at the “level below the state” should be taken with a grain of 
salt. If local organizations do not at the moment have the capacity to conduct their own 
evaluation, that does not mean they lack the capacity to learn it or develop their own method. 
Many organizations will need support, for example financial resources and training, but they 
fundamentally have the capacity to conduct rigorous evaluations. 
Initiating capacity building efforts for grassroots groups is a large undertaking. While 
initiatives like this would traditionally fall on governments, writers like Thomas Carroll feel that 
governments lack the ability to successfully serve as the chief facilitators of capacity building 
efforts. Grassroots groups rely on a strong partnership with national governments to be 
successful, but governments repeatedly let them down. This is because they rarely confer a 
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significant and meaningful amount of autonomy to campesino (farmer) federations, and second, 
because of changing government regimes, are unable to provide reliable and continuous state 
support over long periods (Carroll 2004, 60). Another critic of governments, Raul Zibechi, 
argues that “it is virtually impossible for grassroots movements … to overcome their dependence 
on and subordination to the state” (Zibechi 2009). According to Zibechi, wide-reaching social 
programs claiming to provide assistance to the poor are forms of social control in disguise. 
Grassroots groups, while they rely on national governments, are systematically undermined by 
them.  
Despite this concerning outlook, the international development community continues to 
encourage a greater role played by national governments in enacting and evaluating the success 
of development projects while not pushing for a similar role for grassroots groups. This ideology 
can clearly be seen in 2019's Sustainable Development Report (SDR). The SDR is published in 
conjunction between the private foundation Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network (SDSN), a non-profit directed by Jeffery Sachs, the proponent 
of the SDGs cited previously. The SDSN was set up in 2012 “under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary-General” and “works closely with United Nations agencies” to mobilize “global 
scientific and technological expertise to promote practical solutions for sustainable development” 
(UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network n.d.). Because of the SDSN’s close connection 
to the UN, it can be assumed that this report is most closely aligned with the framework, 
thinking, and evaluation of the SDGs expected by the UN.5  
                                                
5 The SDR notes that “the views expressed in this report do not reflect the views of any organizations, agency or 
programme of the United Nations” (Sachs et al 2019, ii). While this report is not an official publication of the UN, it 
is a relevant and well regarded evaluative source that presents a framework closely resembling UN objectives and 
recommendations.  
 Sterling 35 
 
Unlike SDG-Tracker.org and the GF, the SDR presents a unique evaluation method of 
“transformations.” In the SDR, the 17 SDGs fall into six transformations that promote “effective 
implementation strategies by governments, business, and civil society” (Sachs et al 2019, 2). 
From these transformations, organizations should be able to “develop a clear-eyed 
implementation strategy” for how they can work towards SDG progress in their own country 
(Sachs et al 2019, viii). These transformations have names such as “Education, Gender, and 
Inequality” or “Sustainable Cities and Communities.” Unlike the four dimensions of the GF, 
these transformations do not divide the 17 goals up into six categories. Instead, each 
transformation “contributes to several SDGs and is synergistic with others” (Sachs et al 2019, 2). 
As an example, the transformation “Education, Gender, and Inequality” directly targets SDGs 1, 
2, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10. Yet, SDG 1 does not find a home solely in this transformation. All six of the 
transformations target SDG 1. In some of the transformations, such as “Sustainable Cities and 
Communities,” virtually all SDGs are targeted (Sachs et al 2019, 3). This is the SDR’s “clear-
eyed” methodology. 
The SDR calls for “modern technologies” to play a significant role in monitoring the 
SDGs (Sachs et al 2019, viii). In the case of SDG 1, the report argues “more timely data is 
needed to inform policy intervention[s]” that aim to eradicate extreme poverty (Sachs et al 2019, 
xi). The report calls for “digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence” to be used to “make 
major contributions towards virtually all SDGs” (Sachs et al 2019, 3). While data-informed 
policy decision making is a development industry best practice, relying on technology too 
heavily can be dangerous.  
According to Langdon Winner, “‘technologies in themselves have political properties’” 
and widely adopting technologies leads to “relative distribution of power, authority, and 
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privilege” (Winner 1986, 20, 27). Winner suggests that implementing new technologies produces 
hierarchical systems which have led to a “centralization of social control in large business 
corporations, bureaucracies, and the military” (Winner 1986, 47). He argues that advancements 
in technology have not been guided by legal nor moral limits. Instead, businesses and the 
military have continued to invent “sociotechnical system[s]... in the blind faith that each will turn 
out to be politically benign” and therefore unharmful (Winner 1986, 58). Before society is able 
to articulate moral guidelines on technological pursuits, i.e. some sort of “technical constitution,” 
pursuits of technological accumulation, must be done carefully and under regular monitoring 
(Winner 1987, 57). However, there is no universally accepted mandate for governments, or 
anyone else, to monitor technological advancements. That makes it so that embracing 
technological solutions inherently accepts the knowledge hierarchy that technology perpetuates. 
It is a failure of the SDR to unconditionally advocate for the use of technology like artificial 
intelligence. Without careful leadership, retrofitting development data collection with technology 
will fail to bring those at the last mile into evaluation processes.  
The SDR offers a unique call for “localized assessment” (Sachs et al 2019, ix). The SDR 
authors recognize that the SDGs cannot be reached without “significant involvement of mayors 
and local policy makers” (Sachs et al 2019, ix). This is an important acknowledgement of the 
role multiple groups need to play in development interventions. However, while the report calls 
for local government involvement, there is no mention of organizations that do not hold formal 
power. The SDR’s embrace of “local assessment” does not include the buy-in of grassroots 
organizations who remain yet to be tapped for their extensive knowledge of local contexts. A 
genuine local assessment would require evaluating progress in every hamlet, foothill, valley, and 
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basin. Local governments, which can be anything from a municipality to an administrative 
division, are not sufficiently capable of conducting evaluations at the last mile.  
Current development practice promotes more stakeholder involvement in program design 
and management. Usually, project “stakeholders” refers to all groups affected by interventions. 
The SDR at times alludes to the role that local organizations can play by merging them with all 
stakeholders. For example, when describing how to design more effective strategies, the report 
notes that “governments and other stakeholders need to determine how to organize interventions 
… and how to deploy them for the SDGs” (Sachs et al 2019, 1). It is concerning how vaguely the 
SDR defines “other stakeholders.” Stakeholders can include anyone from international 
corporations to foundations to cooperatives to nature. If “governments and other stakeholders” 
are seen as the only two groups responsible for organizing policy interventions, it seems that 
50% of responsibility falls with the government and 50% to an endless list of stakeholders. The 
role of grassroots organizations does not seem to merit even a specific mention.  
While the SDR pays lip service to an increased role of local governments and 
stakeholders, overwhelmingly, the report focuses on the role of national governments in 
development. The report argues that “tracking … government policies and commitments to 
implement the goals” is a way to gauge whether a country is on “track to achieve the goals by 
2030” (Sachs et al 2019, 4). The report proposes three levels of measuring government efforts. 
These include, high-level public statements in support of sustainable development, strategic use 
of budget, procurement and data, and, “content of government strategies and policy actions” 
(Sachs et al 2019, 4). To track this third level, the report analyses evidence in 43 surveyed 
countries on five points: whether high-ranking officials have made public statements about the 
SDGs, whether they have submitted a voluntary national review of SDG progress, whether SDGs 
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are mentioned in the federal budget, whether there exists a central or federal institution to 
monitor SDG implementation, and whether there have been methods for “stakeholder 
engagement” (Sachs et al 2019, 6).  
The four Latin American countries surveyed (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico) have 
all adopted national monitors for implementing the SDGs. Only Canada (244) surpasses 
Argentina (243) and Brazil (237) with the most indicators. This demonstrates that key leading6 
Latin American countries respond well to taking ownership and contextualizing their 
development efforts with indicators. Contextualizing SDG efforts with country-specific 
indicators is important because “successful models [to ensure public buy in] will differ across 
countries, as they must be mindful of history, customs, and government capacity” (Sachs et al 
2019, 7). While national context is important, local context is arguably more so. There are many 
instances of local history and customs differing from national practices. Local ways of knowing 
should be valid to the same degree as expert and professional knowledge when it comes to 
development implementation and evaluation.  
The SDR is a forceful proponent of government involvement to achieve the SDGs. The 
UN’s focus on offering recommendations to national governments is common sense given that 
the UN is composed of member countries. However, evaluation frameworks about SDG progress 
are limited when they overwhelmingly focus on national government action. The SDR notes that 
mobilizing “the machinery of government for the SDGs” has been generally unsuccessful. This 
conclusion should insinuate that it is time to rethink development evaluations that prioritize 
information transfers between governments and supranational organizations. Grassroots 
evaluation remains largely untapped and absent from international discourse. 
                                                
6 In GDP per capita in Latin America, Brazil and Argentina rank first and third respectively.  
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The SDR is yet another example of an evaluation framework failing to bring awareness to 
development enactment and evaluation happening successfully at the grassroots level. The 
SDR’s Western-centric validation of expert knowledge, faith in technology, and hyper-focus on 
government policy perpetuates traditional development ideology. An alternate method to create 
the intellectual and political space for grassroots organizations to impact development 
evaluations remains unexplored. 
Section Two: Counter-proposals, Shifts, and Alternate Methods 
Luckily, SDG-Tracker.org, the GAPFRAME, and the SDR are not the only ways to 
evaluate progress towards the SDGs. Thomas Carroll imagines an alternate method to affirm 
grassroots evaluation where grassroots organizations have the capacity to generate valuable 
information about their projects. Carroll writes “that to achieve their goals and objectives, local 
groups must develop the same skills as other kinds of organizations, and they are best evaluated 
on the basis of similar criteria” (Waters 2004, 56). Carroll argues “clear, objective criteria” be 
used to “monitor and evaluate how well local organizations are functioning to meet the needs of 
their members” (Waters 2004, 56). Carroll’s proposal calls for increasing the capacity of local 
groups to develop their evaluation skills and then offering the opportunity for them to share their 
progress throughout their development sector. 
Carroll “tests a methodological approach for measuring different facets of organizational 
capacity by using objective criteria in the form of previously-determined indicators” (Waters 
2004, 56-57). This methodology focuses on bringing to the forefront development indicators that 
are based on organizational capacity. Organizational capacity includes leadership, participation, 
organizational culture, resource mobilization and use, sustainability, mediation and negotiation, 
and relationships and alliances. Attempting to measure an organization’s organizational capacity 
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is difficult given that these outcomes are typically regarded in the development field as 
“intangible” and therefore extremely hard to measure and evaluate. However, if Carroll’s 
proposal for a methodology that could measure capacity building indicators was widely adopted, 
this would be a breakthrough for development evaluation worldwide. Unfortunately, determining 
the “objective criteria” and designing a methodology that is adaptable to local contexts is a 
difficult undertaking. Carroll recognizes the shortfalls of his methodology noting that it is not 
“set in stone” (Waters 2004, 58). While his book grapples with the tensions of malleability and 
rigidity, he does not concretely conclude how his vision might be brought into practice. 
Carroll’s writing lays an important intellectual foundation for others studying 
organizational capacity building. He argues that slightly larger non-governmental organizations, 
which he calls intermediary NGOs, are “key protagonists in rural development” by helping to 
catapult the knowledge of grassroots efforts to a more powerful audience (Waters 2004, 58). 
According to Carroll, intermediate organizations are not at the grassroots level, but “represent 
groups of communities and may belong to national organizations” (Waters 2004, 56). Based on 
Carroll’s research of grassroots development,7 he found that “campesino federations with the 
best scores [on capacity building are] the result of patient, long-term support by external agents” 
(Carroll 2004, 59). Carroll observed that success is evident when grassroots groups manage 
programs “but with ongoing advisory assistance” which decreases overtime in later phases of 
projects (Carroll 2004, 59).  
For capacity building to succeed, organizational learning is essential. Carroll states that 
“the external agents,” i.e. grantors, have to adopt a “flexible attitude that frequently” allows for 
“changes in their strategy midstream” (Carroll 2004, 59). Carroll highlights that external agents 
working with the administration of intermediary NGOs catapults the “intimate knowledge of the 
                                                
7 Carroll’s research was commissioned by the Inter-American Foundation 
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unique internal characteristics of each” grassroots organizations to larger development 
organizations (Carroll 2004, 60). Carroll reflects, “few donors can function this way” (Carroll 
2004, 60). Carroll’s proposal of a possible universal methodology to fortify grassroots capacity 
for evaluation may feel aspirational. However, there is evidence that the development industry is 
moving in this direction.  
The 2010 USAID reforms demonstrate a highly influential institution implementing a 
new policy to “directly work with and build the capacity of local governments, civil society, and 
the private sector” (Dunning 2013, 1). The 2010 procurement reform set a goal of channeling 
30% of grants and contracts to local partners by 2015.  
Immediately, the biggest feasibility concern about increasing local transfers centered 
around risk. US policy makers, pushed by for-profit lobbying firms on behalf of the US-based 
contractors lamenting the loss of their contracts, argued that the corruption in grantee countries 
was a significant risk (Dunning 2013, 6). While to some extent concerns about financial risk are 
a factor when considering funding government projects, the hesitation to finance local 
organizations is problematic. To some extent, the distrust of Global South local partners to 
manage finances and responsibly advance development projects can be attributed to subtle 
racism and xenophobia towards citizens of Global South countries. Typically, USAID bases its 
financial partnerships with governments on “data and metrics that test government institutions 
and their fiduciary systems before resources are transferred” (Dunning 2013, 7). USAID is 
accustomed to measuring the trustworthiness of governments. However, it entered this new 
phase of local spending with unease. USAID appeared skeptical that local organizations would 
be capable of fiduciary responsibility and rigorous evaluation. 
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 Casey Dunning’s Center for American Progress report found that local organizations 
were capable, especially if USAID pushed reforms even further.8 For example, the report found 
that transparency of “tracking the local subgrantees of contracts awarded to international 
implementers” is still absent in USAID publications despite the 2010 procurement reforms 
(Dunning 2013, 2). USAID’s main model is to give grants to US-based organizations and then 
those organizations allocate sub grants to their “local partners” to carry out development 
projects. It can be assumed that these USAID contractors, just like any responsible donor, collect 
data on their project success and use that for their internal learning. If USAID pushed their US-
based contract recipients to make sub-grantee information public (i.e. transparency), then USAID 
could identify which local organizations have the best success implementing programs. The 
result could be an increase in resource allocation towards these proven successful and innovative 
organizations. This would allow USAID to streamline capacity building efforts to enable 
trustworthy grassroots organizations to carry out their own evaluation if they are not doing so 
already. Reforming the behavior of multilateral donors like USAID may be an effective way to 
reform development programs and heighten the prominence of grassroots evaluation data.  
This chapter examined alternate methods of attempting to evaluate development progress. 
Evidence from the SDR demonstrates that focus on national indicators is not sufficient. The 
methodology proposed by Thomas Carroll echoes the call for improved methods to evaluate 
development that are responsive to the grassroots. Only when grassroots evaluation practices can 
be lifted to the attention of international actors can it be said that grassroots organizations, 
knowledge systems, and contexts are truly centered in the development discourse. USAID 
procurement reforms may be a step in that direction. The following chapter examines a notable 
                                                
8 It should be noted that Dunning’s report may be offering a sympathetic critique of USAID. The Center for 
American Progress is a DC-area think tank that is considered left learning but not especially radical.  
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attempt at grassroots development and evaluation by a different US government agency: the 
Inter-American Foundation.   
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Chapter Five: The Inter-American Foundation Grassroots Development 
Framework 
 
In 1969, the US Congress founded the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) to fund 
“grassroots development through community-based organizations” (Fiennes and Escobar 2016, 
4). For 50 years, the organization has invested in community-led projects in 5,439 communities 
in 32 Latin American and Caribbean countries (Inter-American Foundation 2019, 10). Their 
grants are almost all less than $400,000 and unlike the model used by many development 
organizations, they require grantees to contribute “counterpart” to complement the IAF’s 
investment. This means, the IAF only makes a grant to the grantee if they mobilize resources, a 
combination of in-kind, cash, or grant donations, to complement the grant given by the IAF. On 
average, for every $1 that the IAF contributes, grantees contribute $1.30 in counterpart (Inter-
American Foundation 2019, 10).  
The IAF uses an evaluative framework called the Grassroots Development Framework 
(GDF) adopted in 2004 which continues to guide the organization’s method to evaluate the 
success of their grantees. Prior to the GDF, the IAF did not use an integrated system and 
evaluation was only done on a case by case basis. In adopting the GDF, the IAF felt that they 
were tackling two of the biggest problems with evaluation methods: that traditional evaluations 
did not capture intangible changes in society and that traditional methods are rarely adaptable to 
diverse projects and organizations in various multilingual countries. The GDF found a solution to 
both. 
The GDF framework organizes both the tangible and intangible indicators into three 
categories of change: at the individual, institutional, and societal levels (Adriance 2004, 47). As a 
part of this model, the grassroots organizations have the opportunity to define for themselves 
which of the indicators proposed by the IAF they would like to adopt. A Foundation 
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Representative (FR) from the IAF visits each organization to work with grantees to decide which 
indicators they want to work towards. The FR works with the community organization closely to 
set up a plan for implementing their desired program while also achieving the goals they have set 
for themselves. This capacity building meeting includes coaching leaders through the GDF 
process, selecting the indicators, and clarifying the procedures that will be necessary for 
thorough and rigorous data collection (Adriance 2004, 47). The FR then departs, leaving 
grassroots leaders with the skills and information they need to carry out and evaluate their own 
projects. 
Every 6 months, a country national data verifier hired by the IAF, returns to the 
community until the completion of the funding. Their role is to “confirm the data compiled by 
the project administrators” and verify through “meetings with the grantee” that the organization's 
internal records match what members of the community say has occurred (Adriance 2004, 47). 
The IAF describes this process as “high touch;” grassroots leaders build their capacity to conduct 
evaluation through ongoing support by the IAF’s local staff. At the end of the grant period, a 
final report is submitted by the data verifier to the FR where the “results and the lessons learned” 
are kept in a database so that there is “the possibility of examining data from a wealth of 
experiences, allowing for in-depth statistical analysis and comparison” (Adriance 2004, 47). 
Then, “the IAF will put these improvements as well as its growing database and institutional and 
cluster analyses at the service of grassroots development” (Adriance 2004, 47). 
         The IAF model incorporates many grassroots evaluation best practices. When the GDF 
model was developed in the late 1990s, it was groundbreaking. While some organizations are 
currently shifting to updated practices for evaluation knowledge sharing, cross-sectoral learning 
has been a part of the IAF mandate since its inception. The IAF mandate states that the 
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organization has a duty to “coordinate its undertakings with the developmental activities in the 
Western Hemisphere” led by other organizations including bodies of the US government (Inter-
American Foundation 1991, 212). Moreover, their mandate extends their intent to collaborate to 
include “international organizations, and other entities engaged in promoting social and 
economic development of Latin America” (Inter-American Foundation 1991, 212). It is 
uncommon to find an organizations’ founding documents requiring a wide breadth of 
accountability and collaboration. This language positions the IAF in a critical place to advance 
global conversations about development in Latin America.  
While the IAF model is successful, it harbors several imperfections. Some development 
practitioners express concern over the nature of high-touch methods similar to the IAF’s work. 
Some may see the “hand-holding” required by the IAF FRs and data verfiers as overstepping the 
role international funders should play. This criticism is not explicitly documented in regards to 
the IAF. On the other hand, there have been studies applauding the IAF’s method. A 2011 and 
2014 Grantee Perception Report conducted by the Center of Effective Philanthropy of the IAF 
and hundreds of other funders, found that the oversight and assistance by the IAF is one of the 
elements that grantees appreciate the most. 
         In 2016, Caroline Fiennes and Diego Escobar conducted an external review of the IAF 
answering the question of what “makes IAF’s approach to evaluation and reporting so helpful to 
its grantees” (Fiennes and Escobar 2016, 4). To conduct their study, Finnes and Escobar used 
evidence from the Grantee Perception Report. The Grantee Perception Report noted that the IAF 
received the highest score ever recorded for the question: “‘How helpful was participating in the 
foundation’s reporting/evaluation process in strengthening the organization/program funded by 
the grant?’”(Fiennes and Escobar 2016, 4). On a scale from one to seven, seven being extremely 
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helpful, in 2014, the IAF scored 6.00. Compared to the results from other funders, the metric 
achieved by the IAF surpasses other organizations by a significant margin; the funders in the 
second and third position for that question scored 5.80 and 5.72 (Fiennes and Escobar 2016, 4). 
These impressive results inspired Fiennes and Escobar to investigate further.  
The Fiennes and Escobar report identified key aspects of the IAF framework that led to 
its success. First, the IAF prioritizes data collection that many grassroots organizations had not 
previously been collecting. After working with the IAF, grassroots organizations were 
empowered with an “empirical basis” to continue and improve their programming. Second, the 
report finds that IAF grantees learn management and analysis skills to “collect, handle, interpret, 
present and use data” which had not previously been known to them. Third, grantees gain 
confidence and courage in their ability to collect accurate and complete data which helps them 
secure future grants from funders. And fourth, the grassroots groups gain credibility with their 
beneficiaries, the broader community, and other organizations. To achieve these results requires 
a large investment by the IAF; the IAF spends 8% of its total budget (a high amount) on 
maintaining the training and guidance component of its reporting process (Fiennes and Escobar 
2016, 5). 
Across the board, the 2014 results of the Grantee Perception Report for the IAF are 
positive. The IAF scored in the 90th percentile or above on many of the questions asked. This 
includes scoring in the 99th percentile for the question; “How helpful has the Foundation been to 
your organization’s ability to assess progress towards your organization’s goals?” and in the 98th 
percentile for the question, “After submission of your report / evaluation, did the Foundation or 
the evaluator discuss it with you?” where 90% of the grantee respondents said “yes” (Fiennes 
and Escobar 2016, 11). There are, however, two key questions that the IAF did not score well in. 
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To the question, “Overall, how fairly did the Foundation treat you?” the IAF scored in the 40th 
percentile and for the question, “To what extent has the Foundation affected public policy in 
your field?” it scored in the 14th percentile (Fiennes and Escobar 2016, 11). While generally the 
results of the Grantee Perception Report are positive, Finnes and Escobar note the considerable 
range that exists: “IAF’s grantees are certainly not uniformly positive about everything” (Fiennes 
and Escobar 2016, 8). Both of these low scores should push IAF’s leaders to tweak and adjust 
the model based on feedback by grantees; it is especially important that no grantee feel they are 
treated poorly by funders.  
The IAF’s low score on affecting public policy is an important point to explore. 
Unfortunately, like many organizations previously discussed, the IAF engages in an internal 
learning feedback loop. The IAF should be using “statistical analysis and comparison” of 
evaluation “from a wealth of experiences” to collaborate with other industry funders. This is, 
unfortunately, not a reality. The GDF is currently under an internal review partly because it does 
not function as it is intended to.9 A weak point within the IAF is connecting the evaluations 
collected by individual FRs to influence development work beyond the agency. Yes, individual 
grantees are benefitting and yes, individual FRs learn best practices across the portfolio of the 
grantees that they manage, but learning that is done internal to the organization does not expand 
beyond its programs. Just how there is a lack of public transparency from USAID about which 
subcontractors are achieving the most positive outcomes, the IAF does not have a system to 
share their learning with other donors, NGOs, and government agencies. The IAF’s work to an 
extent operates in isolation. The organization is small and understandably focused on delivering 
                                                
9 My knowledge of this comes from my experience as an intern in the summer of 2019. This is my conclusion based 
on observations and conversations with colleagues.  
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their evaluation results to the stakeholder that matters most: the US Congress. Yet, they are 
trapped in a system of internal learning. 
A significant disappointment is that the SDGs are nowhere to be found in the IAF 
narrative. As the IAF mandate delineates, the IAF is supposed to coordinate with “international 
organizations, and other entities engaged in promoting social and economic development of 
Latin America” which should include the UN and the SDGs. However, since there is no mention 
of the SDGs in office conversations or the official organization methodology, grantees and FRs 
do not strive to connect their work to greater global efforts. This shortfall may explain why the 
IAF scored so low on the question regarding “affecting public policy” in the broader field. If the 
IAF participated in a framework to extend its learning to reach audiences outside of its 
organization and direct stakeholders, maybe it could have a tangible impact on the industries 
where its grantees operate. If other funders are scoring higher than the IAF on this metric, the 
assumption is that grantees wish that funders expanded their reach. Therefore, the IAF must 
continue to be the nimble, collaborative, responsive, and learning organization it was founded to 
be by responding to the valid concerns from their grantees and to the global need for a broader 
sharing of best practices. 
This chapter explored how even the efforts of a well positioned and highly regarded 
grassroots development organization can fall short of fulfilling the SDG evaluation gap. Even the 
IAF, an organization that whole-heartedly supports grassroots evaluation and performs capacity 
building at a very high level, does not universally receive high marks from grantees and fails to 
engage their learning outcomes in the broader scope of advancing towards the SDGs. If 
organizations like the IAF are going to be supported to break out of a cycle of internal learning, a 
new development industry paradigm for information sharing must come to fruition. The 
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concluding chapter summarizes the challenges of achieving that paradigm shift while offering 
hope that it is possible. Central to that possibility is implementing best practices to capture and 
validate grassroots evaluation through a global channel.   
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Chapter Six: Concluding Best Practices and Hope for a New Paradigm 
No international consensus has identified which supranational organization is capable of 
taking the lead to ensure development evaluation reporting prioritizes grassroots organizations. 
Many Global South countries maintain permanently negative views of global financial 
institutions like the World Bank.10 Therefore, global leadership must originate from a more 
neutral institution. With reforms, the UN Global Pulse Initiative can adopt a credible 
international mandate capable of compiling and disseminating global knowledge about progress 
towards the SDGs. 
Some groups (not the Global Pulse Initiative) have attempted to take on the challenge of 
“global reporting” for gathering evidence towards SDG progress, but they are not appropriate for 
capturing grassroots evaluation. One example is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) which 
asks organizations to submit a report outlining their economic, environmental, and social 
impacts. Unfortunately, the GRI reporting guidelines include hundreds of pages of instructions, 
inevitably excluding most non-profits and grassroots organizations, who already have low 
staffing capacity, from completing a report. The institution that fulfills the role of gathering 
global evidence of progress towards the SDGs needs to have the capacity to receive data coming 
in from small nonprofits, cooperatives, and grassroots organizations. These groups typically only 
have a capacity large enough to evaluate their own programs, not fill out the hundreds of pages 
required by the GRI. 
A concern of creating a “universal” global reporting scheme is whether or not it is ethical 
to institute one given the diverse contexts, desires, and methodologies of local organizations. 
Chandra Mohanty is an author that discusses the tension between the local and the universal. She 
                                                
10 See the Appendix for recommended resources to learn more about these criticisms. 
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writes that it is possible, but of course difficult, to do “multilayered, contextual analysis to reveal 
how the particular is often universally significant—without using the universal to erase the 
particular or positing an unbridgeable gulf between the two terms” (Mohanty 2003, 501). 
Mohanty says that there is value in conducting an analysis across local differences; the learning 
generated from local efforts can positively affect universal understanding. In development, 
generalized analysis, for example by the World Bank and OECD, has historically existed from 
the top-down, not the bottom-up. The tool that the development industry lacks is an information 
channel to capture a shared learning from the grassroots to enable a multilayered, contextualized 
analysis. Following Mohanty’s call for “a framework of solidarity and shared values,” the 
development industry must embrace the shared value of the SDGs while following through on 
solidarity with the knowledge generated from the grassroots (Mohanty 2003, 502). Retooling an 
institution like the Global Pulse Initiative to compile the localized knowledge from the grassroots 
through a flexible system of indicators and disseminate it for all funders, governments, NGOs, 
and grassroots groups, will enable the most equitable transfer of development information 
around the globe.  
The challenge of adopting a new development evaluation paradigm sheds light once more 
on the complexity of development interventions. The reforms to development evaluation will not 
be easy according to Paul Collier. He writes that, “the key obstacle to reforming aid is public 
opinion. The constituency for aid is suspicious of growth, and the constituency for growth is 
suspicious of aid” (Collier 2007, 183). Development interventions are built on a trust between 
those benefiting from development programs and those funding it. That trust has eroded over 70 
years of promises broken. However, what is broken about development can be fixed. The future 
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development evaluation paradigm is not doomed to repeat the failures of the past. To achieve 
success, grassroots development evaluation must play a role in that future paradigm.  
The future evaluation paradigm cannot blindly embrace technology as a means of 
capturing better data. Technology will not magically fix the gaps of data that currently do not 
exist. Supranational organizations and governments have a responsibility to validate data that for 
them may not be easy to access. In the spirit of the SDGs embodying genuine global partnership, 
all development institutions, especially Global North and supranational organizations, must pave 
the way for all levels of evaluation to become globally significant. Grassroots organizations, 
NGOs, and funders have the data the world needs but are trapped operating in their own 
evaluation silos. Breaking down those silos to integrate the entire development evaluation 
ecosystem is necessary so that all efforts can be counted in the progress towards the SDGs.  
For grassroots evaluation to become center stage in the efforts to achieve sustainable 
development, first, capacity building for local organizations needs to include training on how to 
monitor and evaluate development results. Local actors have the capacity to track their own 
progress and conduct analysis, but need the resources and support to get started. Second, an 
institutionalized channel needs to exist to enable data collected at the grassroots (both qualitative 
and quantitative) to reach supranational organizations that publish progress updates. A channel 
housed in the Global Pulse Initiative may fulfill this requirement. Third, industry leaders need to 
set in motion an industry wide shift that will encourage and allow organizations to break down 
their silos of keeping learning internal. Finally, the promise of big data analytics and tech-
enabled data collection needs to be embraced with caution.  
Organizations like the IAF, which have made huge impacts in small communities using a 
grassroots method, deserve appreciation for being industry pioneers. Yet, efforts by grassroots 
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organizations cannot remain a drop in the bucket. The development industry must more fully 
acknowledge that traditional methods have fallen short. Development practitioners have learned 
that collaboration, knowledge sharing, and listening to diverse voices enables vital improvements 
to the work. Now, more than ever, the elements exist to make the next decade one that proudly 
achieves the SDGs. Knowledge from grassroots evaluation, however, will have to take a center 
role if there is any chance of achieving them.   
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